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Abstract
It is shown that quantum-type coherence, leading to indeterminism and interference
of probabilities, may in principle exist in the absence of the Planck constant and
a Hamiltonian. Such coherence is a combined effect of a symmetry (not necessary
physical) and semantics. The crucial condition is that symmetries should apply to
logical statements about observables. A theoretical example of a non-quantum system
with quantum-type properties is analysed.
Coherence, a cornerstone of quantum mechanics, is considered to be a result of
the quantization of action. However, we will show that “quantum-type coherence,” as
we will call it, does not depend on the existence of the Planck constant (although its
concrete manifestations do). In our two examples, E1 and E2, analysed below, such
coherence appears in the presence of:(I) An ordered set of mutually exclusive objects,
with numerical values ξ, ξ ∈A, where A is an affine space (a space with no fixed origin);
ξ is a particle coordinate in E1, and an interpretation of a given situation in E2.
(II) Another ordered set of mutually exclusive objects, with numerical values χ defined
on set (I) as a whole; χ is a value of the particle momentum in E1, and in E2 the ordinal
number of a logical statement in a set of mutually exclusive statements describing the
situation. Conditions(I) and (II) imply the existence of a symmetry. It is shown that
when symmetries apply to logical statements about objects instead of objects “per se,”
the following semantic problems arise: in E1, the problem of expressing the truth values
of logical statements about objects in the second set, in terms of the truth values of
logical statements about objects in the first set; and in E2, the problem of expressing
the truth values of statements in one interpretation when the truth values of the same
statements in another interpretation are given. Inexpressibility is therefore a combined
effect of symmetry and semantics—both irrelevant to h¯. This effect, fundamental for
quantum-type coherence, leads to indeterminism and interference of probabilities.
We will first delineate the border between the symmetry-semantic part (without h¯)
and the quantum part (with h¯) of the quantum mechanical formalism, using an example
of a single, zero-spin particle. Then we will analyse a non-quantum system having
all typical features of quantum-type coherence. Its analysis provides a theoretical
basis for searching for systems, neither classical nor quantum, in which quantum-type
interference can be observed. Observation of such systems, interesting in itself, may
indirectly clarify our understanding of the structure of quantum mechanics and the
origins of quantization.
E1.A quantum example. We will construct the quantum mechanics formalism of
a single, zero-spin particle, introducing assumptions step-by-step so as to make clear
exactly at which point in our construction h¯ is needed. We will tag our assumptions
with Greek letters.
Our fundamental assumption about what makes mechanics “quantum“ is that (α)
the statement Λp0 : “p = p0“ about a particle momentum p (a translational invariant
in the coordinate q-space) should itself be an invariant of the translational symmetry
in the same space. Such a requirement makes sense only if Λp0 , a logical statement, is
simultaneously a function of coordinates, such that it does not depend on transforma-
tions q → q + δq. This is possible only if Λp0 , as a function of coordinates, either does
not depend on q at all, or depends only on differences between coordinates. We suppose
the latter, (β)Λp0(q, q
′) = Λp0(q
′ − q). In our next step, Λp0(q, q
′) is assumed to be a
matrix in q-space; and since Λp0 is a logical statement, we can use logic to calculate
it. Consider the logical equivalence, Λp0 ∧ Λp0 ∼ Λp0 . The natural assumption is that
(γ): the logical conjunction in this equivalence should be represented by the matrix
product, and the logical equivalence by the equation:
∫
Λp0(q
′ − s)Λp0(s − q)ds = Λp0(q
′ − q). (1)
The solution of this equation is Λp0 = L
−1exp2πi(q′−q)λ−1(p0), where the wave length
λ(p0) is an unknown function of p0, and L ≡
∫
dq. The eigenvectors of this matrix
(up to normalization constants) are ψp(q) = exp2πiq/λ(p), λ(p1) 6= λ(p2) for p1 6= p2.
Thus, we already have—without h¯—the correct wave functions and density matrices,
though the dependence of λ on p remains unknown. To be consistent, we now assume
that a statement “q = q0” about particle coordinate q should also be represented in q-
space by a matrix. Obviously this matrix must be (δ) : Λq0(q, q
′) = Kδ(q′−q0)δ(q−q0),
with K constant. The eigenvectors of Λq0 are ψqi(q) = δ(q − qi).
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Matrices Λq0(q, q
′) and Λp0(q, q
′) do not commute; their commutator is not propor-
tional to h¯. While Λq0 is a statement about the exact location of the particle, statement
Λp0 expresses by its own symmetric structure the uncertainty of that location, and is
defined by the momentum value, p0, which, according to the meaning of translational
invariance, relates to q-space as a whole. If, now, Λp0 is true, i.e., is the correct descrip-
tion of the state of the particle, and the question is whether Λq0 is true, the answer
can be at best probabilistic, since the truth of Λp0 is inexpressible in terms of the
truth of any Λqi . Here we have the probability that the conjunction Λp0 ∧ Λq0 is true.
Since, according to (γ), conjunctions are represented by matrix products, and since
the probability should be a translational invariant and be independent of the order of
matrices, the only correct formula is:
w(p0|q0) =
∫
Λp0(q, q
′)Λq0(q
′, q)dqdq′ = K/L. (2)
Only after this step in constructing the quantum formalism need we introduce h¯. The
physical part of the quantum formalism is then defined by the introduction of Hamil-
tonian, canonical transformations, etc.
E2. A non-quantum example. Consider a situation open to interpretation and
describable by different logical connections among n independent logical statements,
λi, i = 1, 2, ..., n. According to the classical logic of propositions, every such description
can be represented by a disjunction of mutually exclusive conjunctions. There are
N = 2n such conjunctions, which can be enumerated as Λk, k = 1, 2..., N ;N ≥ 2.
One, and only one of them, can be true. By definition, a certain (i.e., not uncertain)
interpretation I(s), I(s) = I(s)(k), is the following function of the integer k, k = 1, 2, ...N :
if some Λl is defined as a true statement-conjunction, then I
(s)(k) = δkl. Inversely, if
I(s)(k) = δkl, then in this interpretation Λl is true. Two interpretations are identical
if the corresponding functions are identical. There are only N non-identical certain
interpretations, each defining which one of the N conjunctions is true. N non-identical
certain interpretations can be transformed into each other by permutations, described
by the finite table. That table can be considered as an algorithm defining the truth
values of the conjunctions in all certain interpretations, when the truth values of the
conjunctions in one of them are defined.
Now we will extend our concept of interpretation beyond classical logic by intro-
ducing the following two conditions: (a)(symmetry) There is no correct interpretation
a priori: any statement-conjunction may be considered true. Such a choice defines a
correct interpretation. Once an interpretation is considered correct, N different certain
interpretations can be generated by permutations of truth values. By definition, these
certain interpretations define the meaning of the truth values of N conjunctions. (b)
If there are two interpretations, I(s)(k) and I(s
′)(k), then the difference between them
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is measured by a real number, θ; all values of θ inside an interval θmin ≤ θ ≤ θmax are
permitted; and if I(s)(k) is considered correct, then θ = s′ − s.
More formally, all interpretations are now points in an affine space A1, s ∈ A1, and
~θ is a vector in R1 vector space of real numbers, θ ∈ R1. The group R1 acts on A1 as
the continuous group of parallel displacements. Points of our affine space are functions
defined in their own discrete spaces, each containing N points, N ≥ 2. We will show
that such a system possesses the properties of quantum-type coherence: indeterminism,
interference of probabilities, and the possibility of introducing wave functions, though
none of our assumptions depends on h¯. The reason, qualitatively, is that now we
have a continuum of interpretations; but when we define a meaning of truth values
of N conjunctions that is equal for all interpretations, only N interpretations (which,
according to (a), can be chosen arbitrarily) can be certain. In all other interpretations,
truth values of conjunctions are not certain.
Theorem 1. On the existence of inexpressibility.
If conditions (a) and (b) are met, then either all interpretations are identical or
there does not exist any algorithm, defined for θ in the interval [θmin, θmax], to cal-
culate the truth values of statements in an interpretation I(s
′)(k) when some other
interpretation, I(s)(k), is considered correct
Proof. Let statements Λl, l = 1, 2, ..., N, in some interpretation,I
(0)(l), that is con-
sidered correct, possess given truth values, and let not all interpretations be identical.
Then there exists some θ that defines an interpretation, I(θ)(k), different from I(0)(k).
This means that at least one of the statements in I(θ), let it be Λi, does not possess
the same truth value as Λi in I
(0). Assume that there exists an algorithm mapping the
truth values of statements in I(0) onto the truth values of statements in I(θ). Since two
different distributions of truth values among N statements are permutations of each
other, any assumed algorithm should define the operation of a permutation, which
should depend on θ. Consider the parameter δθ = θ/N ! connecting any two interpre-
tations with s′ − s = δθ. According to our assumption, this parameter defines some
permutation of truth values. Consider N! such consecutive permutations, beginning
from the given distribution of truth values in the initial interpretation, I(0). On one
hand, N! identical permutations give us the same final distribution of truth values as
the initial one. But, on the other hand, since δθ ·N ! = θ, we will arrive at interpreta-
tions I(θ), which is not identical to the initial interpretation. The contradiction means
that our assumption about the existence of a mapping algorithm dependent on θ was
wrong. It also means that not all interpretations can be certain. The truth values of
N conjunctions in uncertain interpretations cannot be expressed in terms of the truth
values of these conjunctions in certain interpretations. ✷
Thus, under the conditions satisfying Theorem 1, the problem of expressing the
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truth values of statements in an arbitrary interpretation, when the truth values of
statements in another, certain interpretation are given, is insoluble. Therefore, in the
general case, if a question arises whether a particular statement in an interpretation
is true when the truth values of statements in another interpretation are given, the
answer is unpredictable. If the concept of probability applies to such a system, then
the probability of a certain answer can depend only on the parameter defining the
difference between interpretations, θ. This leads to
Theorem 2. Under the conditions of Theorem 1, the probabilities p(θ) of complex
events do not obey classical rules, and have interference terms.
Proof.It is sufficient to prove the theorem for the simplest case N=2, in which there
are only two mutually exclusive statements in every interpretation, Λ and Λ; the latter
is the negation of the first. Consider three pairs of interpretations,
(
I(0), I(θ)
) (
, I(θ), I(θ+ϑ)
)
,
and
(
I(0), I(θ+ϑ)
)
. We will label s the statement, either Λ or Λ¯, whose truth values are
interpreted in the (maybe uncertain) interpretation I(s)(k), k = 1, 2; Λ1 ≡ Λ,Λ2 ≡ Λ.
Probabilities of the answer “yes” to the questions “Is Λ(r) (or Λ¯(r)) true, if Λ(s) is true?”
will be denoted as p(s, r) ≡ p(r − s), and p(s, r¯) = 1− p(s, r); and the probabilities of
the answer “yes” to the same questions but with Λ¯(s) instead of Λ(s) will be denoted
as p(s¯, r) = 1 − p(s, r), and p(s¯, r¯) = p(s, r). The equalities follow from the fact that
in any interpretation, certain or not, one of the statements is true and the others are
false, because the disjunction
Λ1 ∨ Λ2 ∨ ... ∨ ΛN ≡ T (3)
is an invariant (a tautology) independent of the choice of interpretation.
Given questions corresponding to the aforementioned three pairs of interpretations,
such that either Λ(s) or Λ¯(s) is true in interpretation I(s) of every pair, the classi-
cal probability formula for the answers should be: p(0, θ + ϑ) = p(0, θ)p(θ, θ + ϑ) +
p(0, θ¯)p(θ¯, θ + ϑ), which can be rewritten as
p(θ + ϑ) = p(θ)p(ϑ) + (1− p(θ))(1− p(ϑ)), classical. (4)
But this equation is violated, for example, when p(θ + ϑ)=0, i.e., when (θ + ϑ) is
such that in interpretation I(θ+ϑ) “yes” (“no”) means the same as the “no” (“yes”)
of interpretation I(0). Choosing θ = ϑ, then, gives us 0 = p2 + (1 − p)2, and this
is impossible. Therefore, there must be an additional term in (4). Moreover, in our
simple case we can calculate this term under the assumption
p(0, θ) = p(θ, 0). (5)
Choosing ϑ = −θ gives us another classical equation: 1 = p2 + (1− p)2, which can be
rewritten as
1 = cos4f(θ) + sin4f(θ), classical, (6)
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where the function f(θ) needs to be found. In this case, the needed additional term
should be 2sin2f(θ)cos2f(θ). From this we can find
f(θ) = aθ (7)
where a is an arbitrary real number. Indeed, from (7) it follows that
p(θ + ϑ) ≡ cos2a(θ + ϑ) = p(θ)p(ϑ) + (1− p(θ))(1− p(ϑ)) + interference term, (8)
interference term = −2sinaθ sinaϑ cosaθ cosaϑ. (9)
This formula gives correct results in cases ϑ = −θ, and aϑ = aθ = π/4, while deviations
from (7) do not.✷
When a = 1/2, formulae (8),(9) coincide with the quantum formulae for a spin
1/2 placed on a plane, with the rotational symmetry around the axis perpendicular
to this plane; θ is an angle between two axes, z and z′, placed on this plane; Λ(z) is
the statement “sz = 1/2“; and Λ¯
(z) the statement “sz = −1/2.“ From this analogy
it is clear that we can introduce formal wave functions as superpositions of certain
interpretations, as defined above, thus introducing a Hilbert space. (We will not do
this here.) There is an essential difference, however, between our non-physical system
and a quantum mechanical one. In quantum mechanics, the discreteness of spin z-
projections is a direct result of SU2 symmetry in a three-dimensional space; such
discreteness would not exist in a system with a rotational symmetry only on a plane.
In our logical system, the discreteness—which is simply the discreteness of logical truth
values—exists independently of symmetries.
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